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0ABSTRACT
We investigate the origin and evolution of the legal institution of citizenship. We compile a new
data set on citizenship laws across countries of the world which documents how these institutions
have evolved from the legal tradition of common and civil law established in the course of the
19th century. We show that in the postwar period citizenship laws have responded endogenously
and systematically to economic and institutional determinants. Original citizenship laws tend to
aﬀect the current legislation persistently, with a particularly strong tendency for jus sanguinis to
be preserved despite discontinuities in the transplanting process for former colonies. The presence
of a large stock of migrants tends to limit the application of jus soli elements, although there is also
evidence of a contrasting tendency for those jus sanguinis countries exposed to large immigration.
The results hold after controlling for additional factors such as the degree of democracy, border
stability, the welfare burden, demographics, and cultural characteristics.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: P16, K40, F22, O15.
Key Words: citizenship laws, international migration, legal origins, democracy, borders.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Each country of the world has established a complex system of rules that govern the attribution of
citizenship. Citizenship is the legal institution that designates full membership in a state and the
associated rights and duties. By regulating the inclusion of newcomers within societies that exhibit
unprecedented diversity, citizenship laws represent powerful tool to promote social cohesion and
preserve common traditions, with implications not only for immigration policy, but also for labor
markets, welfare programs, and international relations.
Citizenship laws come from the two broad traditions of common and civil law. The former
applies the jus soli principle, according to which citizenship is attributed by birthplace: this implies
that the child of an immigrant is a citizen, as long as he is born in the country of immigration.
The latter applies the jus sanguinis principle, which attributes citizenship by descent, so that a
child inherits citizenship from his parents, independently of where he is born. By the end of the
19th century, jus soli predominated in common law countries across the world, while jus sanguinis
was the norm in most civil law countries. During the 20th century, however, citizenship laws
have gone through a process of continuous adaptation, with a marked acceleration after WW2 in
conjunction with the decolonization phase, the collapse of the socialist system, and the pressure
of international migration.
Modern sociopolitical theories have advanced several hypotheses concerning the determinants
of citizenship laws dynamics, on the basis of case studies and non-quantitative cross-country
comparisons. The legal tradition established in a given country is generally believed to exert a
persistent impact on current legislation. Pressure from a large stock of migrants is perceived as
a factor that shapes a country’s attitude toward a more inclusive legislation, i.e., a legislation
that reﬂects elements of jus soli, when originally absent. On the other hand, it has been pointed
out that at the same time immigration could drive jus soli countries toward restrictions of the
automatic entitlement to citizenship for all newborn. According to some political theories, the
combination of these forces would induce convergence toward a mix of jus soli and sanguinis
provisions for countries coming from diﬀerent legal traditions, provided that two preconditions
are met: a consolidated democratic system and stable state borders (Weil, 2001). A commitment
to democracy is in fact expected to lead to a more assimilative attitude toward aliens, while the
2stabilization of borders should reduce the pressure to preserve a national identity through jus
sanguinis. Moreover, since citizenship rights also determine the ability to enjoy welfare beneﬁts,
the shaping of nationality laws has been linked with the nature of the welfare state, with a large
government representing a potential obstacle to the retention of jus soli (Joppke, 1998). This
argument, however, has to be weighted against the potential gain coming from the acquisition
of relatively young new citizens for countries with expensive pension systems and in the midst
of a demographic crisis. Finally, an additional factor that has been the subject of debate is the
inﬂuence of national character and culture. The theory advanced by Brubaker (1992) focuses on
France and Germany as two antagonistic kinds of nationhood, the former more assimilationist,
the latter more ethnocentric, which also diﬀer in their deﬁnitions of citizenship.
In this paper we test the above hypotheses from a political economy perspective through an
empirical investigation of the determinants of citizenship laws and their evolution. Our ﬁrst goal
is to assemble a new data set which codiﬁes citizenship laws across the countries of the world in
the postwar period, with a speciﬁc focus on the provisions that regulate the access to citizenship
at birth. The data set is then used to study the dynamic adaptation of these laws, by relating the
observed patterns to a number of potential determinants, including economic and non-economic
factors.
Our empirical ﬁndings indicate that indeed in the postwar period citizenship laws have re-
sponded endogenously and systematically, through a slow but steady process of adaptation, to the
following economic and non-economic factors. First, the persistence of legal tradition is conﬁrmed
by our data, with a particularly strong tendency for jus sanguinis to be preserved. Second, the
presence of a large stock of migrants has shaped national legislations in the direction of more
exclusiveness, rather than inclusiveness, despite some evidence of a tendency toward adding jus
soli provisions for those jus sanguinis countries which have experienced large immigration. These
results hold after controlling for additional factors such as the degree of democracy, border sta-
bility, colonial history, the welfare burden, demographics, and cultural characteristics. We also
ﬁnd that a high degree of democracy is signiﬁcantly associated with more inclusiveness, and that
border instability has been a decisive factor in shaping citizenship laws, particularly following the
decolonization phase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related economics
3literature. Section 3 reviews the historical and legal background for the issues we address. Section 4
describes our data set on citizenship laws around the world. Section 5 investigates the determinants
of current citizenship laws and presents our main results, together with a set of robustness checks.
Section 6 develops an alternative empirical strategy that highlights the determinants of change
in citizenship laws. Section 7 concludes and indicates directions for future research. The Data
Appendix collects information about the data employed.
2 Related literature
While the institution of citizenship has not yet been the subject of investigation by economists,
our work is closely related with several branches of the economics literature. First of all, this
paper contributes to the research program which has focused on the historical determinants of in-
stitutions. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) highlight the relevance of wealth inequality and political
factors in accounting for how fundamental economic institutions developed over time. Acemoglu et
al. (2001) contribute to the understanding of how institutions evolve by using historical variables
as instruments for contemporary measures of the quality of institutions.
This paper also relates to the comparative-legal approach initiated by La Porta et al. (1998).
The basic premise of this research line is the recognition that laws in diﬀerent countries are adopted
or transplanted from a few legal traditions and that the resulting legislative bodies reﬂect both
the inﬂuence of the legal origin and the subsequent revision speciﬁc to individual countries. We
add to this stream by focusing on the determinants of the dynamic adaptation of nationality rules.
Furthermore, our work adds to research on international migration and migration policy in
a long-term perspective. Timmer and Williamson (1998), Hatton and Williamson (2004) and
Bertocchi and Strozzi (2005) empirically analyze immigration policies enacted in diﬀerent historical
phases, while O’Rourke and Sinnott (2003) and Mayda (2005) estimate voters’ attitudes toward
immigration. The political economy of migrationh a sb e e nm o d e l e db yB e n h a b i b( 1 9 9 6 ) ,R a z i ne t
al. (2002), and Gradstein and Shiﬀ (2004). None of these papers, however, considers the speciﬁc
role of citizenship laws.
Finally, recent work by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) on the op-
timal determination of the size of nations, and thus state borders, is also relevant to our approach,
4both because country size in this literature is the same as population size and is potentially in-
ﬂuenced by migration and by the legal status of immigrants, and also because borders play an
important role on the determination of citizenship rules.
3 Citizenship laws in historical perspective
Citizenship is associated with a precise set of rights and duties. It provides beneﬁts such as the
right to vote, better employment opportunities, the ability to travel without restrictions, legal
protection in case of criminal charges, and the possibility to obtain a visa for a relative. There are
also costs to citizenship, such as the military draft, renunciation of the original citizenship, and
the pecuniary and non pecuniary costs that may be required for naturalization and for recognition
at the age of majority (language and culture tests, waiting periods, and a commitment to avoid
activities leading to disqualiﬁcation).
Citizenship policy can be viewed as part of broader migration policy. However, contrary to
other migration policy measures such as quotas and visa requirements, that are typically adjusted
to the business cycle and to the current government orientation, citizenship laws reforms tend to
be the outcome of long-term processes of adaptation often involving constitutional amendments.
There are several ways to acquire citizenship: at birth, by naturalization, by marriage. As
mentioned, citizenship at birth is closely related to the well-deﬁned bodies of common and civil
law, since the ﬁrst traditionally applies jus soli, the second jus sanguinis. Citizenship at birth
regulates citizenship acquisition by second-generation immigrants, i.e., the children born of ﬁrst-
generation immigrants in the immigration country.
In 18th century Europe jus soli was the dominant criterion, following feudal traditions which
linked human beings to the lord who held the land where they were born. The French Revolution
broke with this heritage and with the 1804 civil code reintroduced the ancient Roman custom
of jus sanguinis. Continental modern citizenship law was subsequently built on these premises.
During the 19th century the jus sanguinis principle was adopted throughout Europe and then
transplanted to its colonies. By imitation, Japan also adopted jus sanguinis in this phase. On
the other hand, the British preserved their jus soli tradition and spread it through their own
colonies, starting with the United States where it was later encoded in the Constitution. By the
5end of the 19th century, the process of nation-state formation and the associated codiﬁcation
eﬀort were completed in Continental Europe. At the same time, the revolutionary phase was
over in those countries that had been the subject of the earlier colonization era, and 19th century
colonization had extended the process of transplantation of legal tradition to the rest of the world.
Therefore, at that stage, most countries of the world had established speciﬁcp r o v i s i o n sr e g a r d i n g
citizenship acquisition within a relatively well-developed legal system, with jus soli being the norm
in common law countries, and jus sanguinis regulating citizenship law in most civil law countries.
However, the next century witnessed a continuous process of transformation of citizenship laws
across the world. Below are some speciﬁc cases, drawing mostly from Joppke (1998), Aleinikoﬀ
and Klusmeyer (2000, 2001) and Brubaker (1992).
The United States Jus soli was encoded in the US Constitution through the 1868 Fourteenth
Amendment, with the speciﬁc purpose to protect the birthrights of black slaves. Consistently
with its history as a country of immigrants, and with a general positive attitude toward economic
liberalism, the US approach is still remarkably inclusive in all its aspects, ranging from immigration
policy to naturalization requirements. Debate about possible restrictions did arise recently, but
never led to actual change.1 In particular, jus soli came under attack in the 1980s regarding
its applicability to the children of illegal immigrants. A relatively young and thin welfare state
contributes to the ﬁscal sustainability of jus soli in this country.2 As a result of these combined
elements, current citizenship law in America diﬀers considerably from that of another classic land
of immigration such as Australia, where jus soli had similarly been introduced by the colonists.
In the postwar period, Australia went through numerous legislative and administrative reforms.
Jus soli survived until 1986, while afterwards a person born in Australia must have at least one
parent who is either an Australian citizen or a permanent resident in order to acquire citizenship.
Latin America In the face of a civil law tradition which had been transplanted by the European
powers, this area has followed a rather peculiar pattern. At independence, most of the incipient
1In his analysis of Mexican immigration, Huntington (2004) has criticized current nationality regulations on the
grounds that they represent a “devaluation of citizenship”.
2T h er e l a t i v et h i c k n e s so ft h ec o n c e p ti t s e l fo fc i t i z e n s h ip, if compared to residency, is a related, potentially
relevant consideration: in the US, for instance, citizenship is relatively thin, in the sense that it confers few
additional beneﬁts if compared with residency.
6states chose jus soli as a way to break with the colonial political order and to prevent the metropoles
from making legitimate claims on citizens born in the new countries. Jus soli was encoded in the
Constitution of Brazil in 1824, of Venezuela in 1830, of Argentina in 1853. Therefore, most of
Latin America was already a jus soli country before the 19th century immigration waves began.
Jus soli is still the prevalent rule in the area, even if it is no longer attracting immigrants. Mexico
represents a special case where jus soli was also adopted in the 1814 insurgent Constitution, but
was then abandoned in 1836, only to come back to stay with a Constitutional Amendment in
1937.
The United Kingdom British nationality law has been deeply aﬀected by the imperial expe-
rience. Because of its colonial history, the concept of nationality in the UK was, up to WW2,
particularly extensive, since all subjects of the British Empire had equal access to British citi-
zenship simply by establishing residence in the UK. The 1948 Nationality Act created the status
of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies for people with a close connection to the UK
and its colonies. Following a postwar wave of colonial immigration, this open-door policy was
progressively restricted, even though special status is still attributed to citizens of the British
Commonwealth. Redeﬁnitions of national citizenship have been eﬀectively employed, since the
1980s, as a form of selective immigration policy. The 1984 British Nationality Act restricts jus
soli by establishing that a child born in the UK qualiﬁes for British citizenship only if at least one
parents is a British citizen or resident.
France The emergence of the nation-state in Continental Europe was the main factor that shaped
citizenship law in this area. The revolutionary experience was particularly important for France,
where jus sanguinis was ﬁrst introduced with the 1804 Civil Code and maintained for the entire
course of the 19th century, even though military consideration introduced early on elements of jus
soli. In order to secure immigrants’ children born in France to the draft, in 1889 double jus soli
became automatic, making the experience of this country a unique one. After WW2, large-scale
immigration, especially from North Africa, raised concern regarding assimilation. Citizenship
issues and the rights of immigrants became the object of heated debate in French politics. In 1993
Chirac introduced a restrictive revision to the legislation, that required a formal citizenship request
from second-generation immigrants. With the Left regaining political power in 1997, however,
7these restrictions were considerably revised, with the automatic assignment of citizenship at age
18 to those immigrants’ children born in France who had neither requested, nor declined it. The
case of France is frequently compared with Germany. Brubaker (2002) has inﬂuentially argued
that the diﬀerent path followed by these countries has been shaped by their cultural diﬀerence,
with France sticking to its tradition of assimilationist nation, and Germany to its ethnic identity.
Germany The single most relevant event in the history of German citizenship law is certainly the
fall of the Berlin wall, which paved the way for the achievement of stable national borders. Prior
to that, the massive guest-worker immigration of the postwar period, mostly from Turkey but
also from Southern Europe, had started to put under strong pressure, but to no avail, the original
Wilhelminian citizenship law of 1913, which had established strong sanguinis ties with German
overseas emigrants. With the foundation of the GDR and the consolidation of the Eastern Block,
Germany found itself in the paradoxical situation of having to live with a large population of
d i s e n f r a n c h i s e df o r e i g n e r sb o r no ni t ss o i la thome, and at the same time with millions of ethnic
Germans living behind the Iron Curtain. Achieving border stability was a decisive factor in pushing
Germany toward the long-delayed adoption of jus soli elements. A ﬁrst step in this direction was
the new Foreigner Law in 1990, which turned naturalization from the discretionary exception into
the rule. A major overhaul of the legislation, following an intense political struggle, was ﬁnally
approved in 1999. Jus soli is now the norm in Germany (under the mild requirement that one
parent has lived in the country for eight years). In the evaluation of the German experience,
other factors that may have delayed the introduction of jus soli are, as previously suggested, the
strong ethnic character of German national identity, and the thick nature of the German welfare
state. The latter aspect may have played a role in shaping the evolution of citizenship policies in
several other European countries and especially the Scandinavian ones, where jus sanguinis was
functional to the large past emigration ﬂows, but had recently to adapt to the quickly changing
conditions, especially for high-immigration Sweden. As documented by Weil (2001), restricted
forms of double jus soli are de facto applied, by now, in the vast majority of European countries,
which recently adapted their legislation to the globalization of international migration and its
increasing impact on Europe. In particular, in the entire EU, with the exceptions of Austria,
Greece and Luxembourg, access to citizenship by second and third generation is facilitated.
8Decolonization Postwar decolonization had a major impact on citizenship rules applied around
the world, and not only through the indirect impact on the metropolitan countries we previously
examined. The vast majority of the African colonies that were subject to civil law countries
practicing jus sanguinis stuck to this principle after independence. On the other hand, many for-
mer UK and Portuguese colonies rejected the jus soli tradition and switched to an often strongly
ethnically tinged version of jus sanguinis. For instance, Sierra Leone’s 1961 Constitution estab-
lished that citizenship is transmitted only by descent and only to children whose father and a
grandfather were Sierra Leoneans of African-Negro descent. In situations where instability was
pushed to an extreme degree by the young age and the arbitrary borders of these countries, and
was compounded with deep ethnic division, jus sanguinis tended to prevail as a way to control
more easily the formation of national entities. At the same time, however, the associated exclusive
notion of ethnic and tribal identity caused enormous problems in countries where colonial rule
had left shaky democratic institutions. To these days, ethnic conﬂict lies at the roots of a chronic
manipulation of citizenship rules in favor of one ethnic group over others. The 1964 Congolese
Constitution, in an eﬀort to exclude Rwandan immigrants, recognized citizenship only for persons
whose parents were members of one of the tribes established within the territory by 1908. In 1981
Mobutu signed a new law on nationality requiring an ancestral connection to the population re-
siding in the territory as far back as 1885. Marginalization and de-facto statelessness of signiﬁcant
strata of the population is the unavoidable outcome of these policies.
The disintegration of the USSR Another major wave of citizenship law codiﬁcation followed
t h ed i s i n t e g r a t i o no ft h eU S S R .T h ea r e ah a dbe e ns e a l e dt o w a r di n t e r n a t i o n a lm i g r a t i o nb u t ,a sf o r
all empires, there had been considerable migration within. The Soviet Union had occupied Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. During the following decades millions of Russians were encouraged
to settle in Latvia and Estonia (less so in Lithuania) in order to Russify them. To these days,
large Russian-speaking, stateless, sizeable minorities are still present. After independence, the new
citizenship laws of these three states reﬂected this heritage with an emphasis on jus sanguinis as
the basis for acquiring citizenship. Lithuania, which was the least aﬀected by Soviet immigration
policy, showed the most inclusive, and Latvia the most exclusive attitude toward ethnic Russians.
The issue for these states was how to balance a need to reconstitute their national identity around
an ethnic model, and a commitment to democratic values with respect to the rights of minorities.
9Estonian and Latvian laws were sharply criticized by international organizations on the grounds of
human rights. In the anticipation of EU integration, these recommendations were indeed fulﬁlled
in the more recent legislation of the Baltics, while most other countries of the area still persist
with discriminatory policies. By contrast, for the case of the Russian Federation, the salient fact
in shaping current citizenship policy is the perception that many of its citizens are outside its
borders, spread around the former regions of the USSR. Again, this perception as a country of
emigrants pushes toward the persistence of jus sanguinis as the main principle, even though small
concessions to jus soli have been made.
4 The data: Citizenship laws of the world
We compile a data set of citizenship laws across the countries of the world for the postwar period.
The principal source for the information we codify is a directory published by the Investigations
Service of the United States Oﬃce of Personnel Management in 2001, which provides synopses
of the citizenship laws currently practiced in 190 countries. The sources for this directory were
Embassies, the Library of Congress, and the Department of State. We supplement this information
with additional one from the CIA World Factbook (2002), the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees (2003), and the survey in Weil (2001).
The principal focus of our codiﬁcation is citizenship acquisition at birth, but we also collect
information about naturalization requirements.
4.1 Citizenship at birth
We attribute to each country an appropriate code for citizenship laws in 2001 and for citizenship
laws at the beginning of the postwar period. We take 1948 as the starting point, even though there
were nearly no reforms in citizenship laws during the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ec e n t u r y ,s ot h a tm o s to ft h e
legislation in place in 1948 had actually been developed much earlier. On the other hand, 1948
predates the decolonization phase and the related legislative reforms.3 We also code citizenship
3By treating 1948 as the initial year, we include in our sample the postwar decolonization phase with the
exemption of the Middle East, which gained independence from the British and French administration in the
1943-1948 period.
10laws in the intermediate year 1975, which divides the postwar sample into two subperiods of equal
length.
Since we focus on the degree of inclusiveness of the law toward immigrants, our classiﬁcation
stresses the degree to which a country’s legislation applies elements of jus soli. For 1948, 1975
and 2001, we divide countries into three groups: countries subject to jus sanguinis without any
jus soli element (Group 1), countries that apply a mixed regime (Group 2), and countries subject
to full jus soli (Group 3). A mixed regime includes elements of both jus soli and jus sanguinis.4
Our data set includes those 162 countries for which we were able to collect information on both
original and current citizenship laws, and for which migration data were available for the postwar
period.5
The diﬀerential patterns of evolution that citizenship laws generate in 1948, 1975 and 2001
are summarized by the transition matrices in Table 1, which reveals considerable variations both
across countries and over time. The table shows that in 1948 jus soli was the rule in about 47%
(i.e., 76 out of 162) of the countries, while jus sanguinis dominated in 41% (i.e., 67 out of 162),
and the mixed regime was adopted in the remaining 12% (19 countries). Among the countries
that were under jus soli in 1948, we ﬁnd the United States, Canada, all the Oceanian countries,
most of Latin America, within Africa and Asia the British and Portuguese colonies, within Europe
the UK, Ireland and Portugal. On the other hand, in 1948 jus sanguinis predominated in most of
Europe, including its Eastern part. As explained in Section 3, France was unique in its early choice
of a mixed regime. Since we treat colonial territories as subject to the metropolitan countries’
regime until independence, the group applying the mixed regime in 1948 includes France and its
colonies.
By 1975, 31% (i.e., 50 out of 162) of the countries had jus soli, 62% (101) jus sanguinis, and 7%
(11) a mixed regime. The main event justifying this evolution is decolonization, with many former
colonies switching to jus sanguinis, from jus soli when the UK and Portugal were the metropolitan
country, and from the mixed regime in the case of France (see Section 3). As of 2001, 24% (i.e., 39
out of 162) of the countries apply jus soli, 54% (88) jus sanguinis, and 22% (35) a mixed regime.
It has mostly been the adaptation of the legislation of many European countries, relaxing pure jus
4For details on our classiﬁcation criteria see the Data Appendix, part A.
5For details on migration data see the Data Appendix, part C.
11sanguinis in favor of a mixed regime, that explains the pattern observed for the second subperiod.
Among the countries that still adhere to the jus soli principle in 2001 are the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland (which - however - recently introduced restrictions to jus soli
with a June 2004 referendum). The UK and Australia, on the contrary, no longer adhere to it.
Overall, jus sanguinis is currently the most common regime, with 69% of the countries in Africa,
83% in Asia, and 41% (down from 88%) in Europe. The growing group where a mix of provisions
is applied is particularly well-represented in Europe, with 56% of the European countries including
the formerly jus soli United Kingdom. On the other hand, jus soli predominates in the Americas,
with 89% of the countries in Latin America, and the entire North America (i.e., the US and
Canada).
Table 1 reveals three diﬀerent patterns of transitional dynamics: stability, switch, and con-
vergence. Stable countries lie along the diagonal. Looking at the 1948 to 2001 transition, we see
that a large fraction (28%, i.e., 46 out of 162) have started and ended as jus sanguinis. In other
words, it is 69% (i.e., 46 out of 67) of the originally jus sanguinis countries that have remained
so. By contrast, 22% (36 out of 162) are steadily jus soli countries: this means that only 47% (36
out of 76) of the originally jus soli countries have not changed their policies. Oﬀ diagonal, there
is a sizeable proportion of countries (19%, or 31 out of 162) that have switched from jus soli to
sanguinis, by completely eliminating birthplace as a criterion: most of them - as mentioned - are
former African colonies of the UK and Portugal, which made this radical choice at independence.
Looking at the two subperiods, we see most of these switches occur between 1948 and 1975. Fi-
nally, there is evidence of a process of convergence to a soli/sanguinis mix, which aﬀects 18% of
the countries (29 out of 162, of which 20 converge from jus sanguinis by adding jus soli elements,
while 9 converge from jus soli by restricting it) and intensiﬁes between 1975 and 2001.
In Table 2 we present further information on citizenship laws evolution by reporting changes in
citizenship laws, organized by original laws. Over the 1948-2001 period, 74 countries (46%) have
gone through a change in the laws, with 45 changes occurring in the ﬁrst subperiod, and 33 in the
second.6 In particular, in the ﬁrst subperiod, the majority of the countries that went through a
change (29, or 64%) were originally jus soli. As mentioned, this pattern is determined largely by
the behavior of former colonies. In the second subperiod, the majority of the countries that went
6A few countries went through more than one change.
12through a change (20, or 61%) were originally jus sanguinis, most of which adopting a more open
legislation.
Summary statistics for our citizenship laws data set are reported in Table 3. The correlation
between 1948 and 2001 citizenship laws is 0.42, which points to some persistence, as conﬁrmed by
the even higher correlation between 1948 and 1975 (0.60) and 1975 and 2001 laws (0.81).
4.2 Citizenship by naturalization and the general inclusiveness index
Naturalization policies are also relevant to the issues at hand. Indeed, to facilitate naturalization
for immigrant parents may represent a substitute mechanism to attribute citizenship to children
born in jus sanguinis countries. Besides, the general attitude revealed by a country’s regulation of
citizenship at birth is also reﬂected in its naturalization laws, with jus soli countries traditionally
making naturalization much easier, at least for resident aliens. Within jus sanguinis countries,
naturalization requirements again tend to be correlated with the revisions introduced for citizen-
ship at birth. Basic rules for naturalization may include a period of residence, renunciation of
other citizenship, familiarity with the language and customs of the country, and the availability
of adequate means of support.7
We code data for naturalization only for 2001. We classify countries on the basis of the
number of years of residence required for naturalization, by constructing four classes (more than
14 years, 6 to 14 years, 5 years, 4 years or fewer). Alternative ways to deﬁne classes yielded similar
conclusions.8 In our data set 62 countries (i.e., 44%) require ﬁve years of residence, which can be
considered a relatively open attitude, while 46% require more time and only 10% are more open.
We then combine the information we collected on citizenship at birth and naturalization within
a single measure. To this end, we treat citizenship laws in 2001 as an ordinal variable, by imposing
that jus sanguinis corresponds to minimal, and jus soli to maximal inclusiveness. Next, by averag-
ing with equal weights the two indexes just described, we construct a general inclusiveness index
deﬁned on the 0-1 interval, with maximum inclusiveness being associated with 1. The corrected
Cronbach’s alpha of the indicator is 0.54, which assures suﬃcient reliability.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for naturalization and the inclusiveness index. The correla-
7We do not consider naturalization by marriage, since it is heavily dependent on family law.
8For naturalization we have information on 142 of our 162 countries.
13tion between citizenship laws and naturalization is 0.37. The inclusiveness index has a correlation
of 0.77 and 0.70 with citizenship laws and naturalization, respectively.
5 The determinants of citizenship laws
5.1 Empirical speciﬁcation
To investigate the determinants of citizenship laws evolution in the postwar period, we estimate
multinomial logit models with current citizenshipl a w sa sd e pe n d e n tv a r i a b l e .T oa c h i e v em a x i m u m
generality we do not impose any order among the three available regime choices. Our dependent
variable is categorical and can take three values: 1 if the country has a jus sanguinis regime, 2
if the country has a mixed regime, and 3 if the co u n t r yh a saj u ss o l ir e g i m e . T h es a m p l ew e
consider includes two cross sections of 162 countries: the ﬁrst cross section refers to the 1950-
1975 subperiod, the second cross section to the 1976-2000 subperiod. In the full speciﬁcation we
present, the multinomial logit model we run has the following form:
Cit = aSit + bMit + cSitMit + dPt + Z
0
ite +  it, (1)
with i =1 ,...,162 and t =1 ,2( w h e r et = 1 refers to the 1950-1975 period and t = 2 refers to the
1976-2000 period).9
In speciﬁcation (1), Cit represents citizenship laws in country i at the end of period t, Sit is
a dummy for the presence of jus sanguinis in country i at the beginning of each subperiod, Mit
is migration stock in country i in period t, SitMit is the interaction between the previous two
variables, Pt is a time dummy, Zit is a vector of additional explanatory variables, and  it is the
error term.10
The set of explanatory variables Zit can be divided into two groups. The ﬁrst group includes
dummies capturing the country’s geopolitical position. Within this group we consider a set of
dummies capturing a country’s history of border changes (decolonization, Berlin wall, other border
9We also run multinomial logit models for two types of more parsimonious speciﬁcations, for comparison
purposes.
10In particular, Ci1 and Ci2 are citizenship laws in country i in 1975 and 2001, respectively; Si1 =1i fc o u n t r yi
has jus sanguinis in 1948 and Si2 =1i fc o u n t r yi has jus sanguinis in in 1975; Mi1 is migration stock in country i
in 1960 and Mi2 is migration stock in country i in 1980; P1 =0a n dP2 =1 .
14changes)11 and dummies for Latin American, Southern European and small countries. The second
group of explanatory variables includes a measure of democracy, proxies for cultural characteristics
such as religious aﬃliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the size of government, and the
share of young in the population.
The Data Appendix collects information on the deﬁnitions and sources of all variables we
employed. Table 4 presents their summary statistics.
We can now suggest a number of speciﬁc hypotheses regarding the potential role of the above
mentioned factors, starting with the variables we consider focal to our analysis, i.e., legal tradition
and immigration. Throughout the following, we will organize our comments in terms of our
multinomial logit estimates, taking the group of countries which at the end of the period have a
jus sanguinis regime as the reference category.
Legal tradition is identiﬁed by a dummy for countries that apply jus sanguinis at the beginning
of each subperiod (Sit). We select this dummy because jus sanguinis is the most persistent of the
three regimes, thus suggesting a particularly signiﬁcant role of this initial legislation. A negative
value of the dummy’s coeﬃcient for a mixed and jus soli regime would imply that jus sanguinis
c o u n t r i e sa r el e s sl i k e l yt oe n du pi nt h em i x e da n dj u ss o l ig r o u p s ,t h u sc o n ﬁrming persistence of
the original laws.
Migration (Mit) is measured by the stock of migrants in percent of the population at the
beginning of each subperiod. For the ﬁrst subperiod, we enter the stock in 1960, while for the
second we enter the stock in 1980. By entering the migrant stock near at the beginning of
each period, we avoid any potential endogeneity problem of migration with respect to citizenship
laws, since it is unlikely that stocks evaluated at the beginning of the period could be aﬀected by
subsequent changes in citizenship laws. A positive coeﬃcient for the mixed regime would indicated
that high migration pushes toward it rather than toward jus sanguinis, and similarly for the jus
soli regime.
The interaction between the jus sanguinis dummy and migration should reveal additional
information: if positive, its coeﬃcients would indicate that indeed those jus sanguinis countries
facing high migration tend to add jus soli elements. In particular, a positive coeﬃcient for the
mixed regime would suggest convergence toward the intermediate group. On the other hand, the
11The Appendix, part B describes how the three border change dummies are constructed.
15coeﬃcients of the interaction could also turn out to be negative since, in the presence of a large
stock of migrants, the natives’ reaction could be a conservative one.
Turning to our geopolitical dummies, if border stability really counts as a prerequisite for the
introduction of birthrights for the immigrants, as suggested by some of the political theories in-
troduced in Section 1, we should expect negative signs for the coeﬃcients for our border change
dummies. We introduce the Latin America dummy to capture the peculiarity of this continent’s
experience. As explained in Section 3, most of Latin America adopted jus soli long before our
sample period, so its current position is not determined by postwar developments and in particular
by its postwar migration experience. If indeed the behavior of Latin America diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from the rest of the sample in being associated with a higher probability of adopting jus soli, it
should exhibit a positive coeﬃcient for this kind of legislation. For Southern Europe, we should
expect a positive coeﬃcient for the mixed regime since these countries have been experiencing
quickly increasing migration during the second subperiod, with most of the revision to the legis-
lation toward mixed regimes occurring in the past 15 years or so. Finally, since migration data
reveal that countries with a small population tend to have large and erratic ﬁgures, with a dispro-
portionately small impact on their legislation, we should expect negative signs for this dummy’s
coeﬃcients.
The establishment of a consolidated democracy - measured by the political rights variable
- should exert a positive eﬀect on inclusiveness even though, once again, even in a democratic
country exclusionary forces against outsiders may persist for a protracted period of time. The
possible impact of cultural factors is proxied here by two diﬀerent regressors, in an eﬀort to capture
several dimensions of cultural diﬀerences. In particular, we include the share of Catholics in total
population and an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
The size of government is meant to proxy for the nature of the welfare state: if a thicker,
more expensive and more redistributive structure would represent an obstacle to the inclusion of
relatively poor immigrants, we would found negative coeﬃcients. On the other hand, if young im-
migrants could oﬀer a solution to domestic demographic imbalances, we would ﬁnd that countries
with a higher share of young in total population would be less prone to adopt jus soli elements,
thus displaying negative coeﬃcients.
Pairwise correlations among our dependent and independent variables are presented in Table
165. Current citizenship laws, the dependent variable, is highly correlated (-0.64) with the initial
citizenship laws as identiﬁed by the jus sanguinis dummy, while its correlation with the civil law
dummy is much lower (-0.15). Citizenship laws are also signiﬁcantly correlated with migration, the
small country dummy, political rights, the Catholic share, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
Pairwise correlations between all our independent variables can be found in the Table Appen-
dix (Table A.1). The dummy reﬂecting jus sanguinis as the initial law is negatively correlated
with decolonization (-0.31) and Latin America (-0.43). The Latin America dummy is positively
associated with the Catholic share (0.52). Political rights tend to be low in countries with high
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (-0.36). The share of young in population is positively associated
with migration stocks (0.35). Overall, these stylized facts are in line with previous research and
economic intuition. It is also clear that several of our independent variables are closely interrelated
and that it may be diﬃcult to disentangle their speciﬁce ﬀect on the evolution of citizenship laws.
5.2 Results
The results of our multinomial logits are presented in Table 6. The table reports three diﬀerent
speciﬁcations. Multinomial logit (a) is the core speciﬁcation, which includes only the core variables,
i.e., migration and jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law, plus the dummy period. Multinomial
logit (b) is an expanded speciﬁcation, which adds to (a) the dummies we discussed above. Finally,
multinomial logit (c) is our full speciﬁcation, which adds to (b) the other potentially relevant
regressors. Jus sanguinis is the reference category for all the results shown. Hence, the results
reported in the table indicate the impact of the explanatory variable on the probability of choosing
either the mixed or the jus soli regimes, relative to jus sanguinis.
Starting with the core speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the core variables are all signiﬁcant. In
particular, migration and jus sanguinis display negative coeﬃcients for both the mixed regime
and jus soli, while both coeﬃc i e n t sa r ep o s i t i v ef o rt h ep e r i o dd u m m y . T h i sm e a n st h a th i g h
migration and a jus sanguinis origin decrease the probability of applying a mixed or a jus soli
legislation rather than jus sanguinis, and that in the second subperiod the probability of applying
a mixed or jus soli legislation increases.
In the speciﬁcation which includes the dummies, the jus sanguinis origin still exerts a negative
impact on the probability of applying a mixed or jus soli regime, while migration only remains
17signiﬁcantly negative for the probability of applying a mixed regime. The period dummy is
signiﬁcantly positive only for the probability of a mixed regime. As expected, the decolonization
dummy displays two negative coeﬃcients, i.e., having gone through a decolonization border change
negatively aﬀects the probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime. South Europe has
a positive coeﬃcient for the mixed regime, conﬁrming that Southern European countries have a
higher probability of becoming mixed. Latin America has a positive coeﬃcient for jus soli, since
these countries have a higher probability of applying this regime. The small country dummy is
not signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation.
Finally, in the full speciﬁcation, the impact of migration, a jus sanguinis origin and the pe-
riod dummy are conﬁrmed.12 The interaction term between migration and jus sanguinis origin is
signiﬁcant and positive for both the mixed regime and jus soli, uncovering a tendency for coun-
tries with a jus sanguinis origin which are exposed to high migration to be more inclusive and,
in particular, to apply a mixed regime with highest probability. In this extended version the
coeﬃcient for decolonization loses signiﬁcance. However, inspection of the marginal eﬀects for
decolonization (see Table 7) conﬁrms that even in the full speciﬁcation the regressor retains a
signiﬁcantly negative impact on the probability of jus soli.13 T h er o l eo ft h eL a t i nA m e r i c aa n d
Southern Europe dummies is conﬁrmed, while the small country dummy now reveals a negative
impact on the probability of applying a mixed regime. The size of government has a positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the probability of applying a jus soli regime, while the share of young in
the population exerts a negative impact on inclusiveness, in support of the hypothesis that coun-
tries with a relatively old population are more likely to choose mixed and jus soli regimes. The
variables meant to capture cultural characteristics, i.e., the share of Catholics and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, are both insigniﬁcant, while a high degree of democracy positively aﬀects the
probability of applying either a mixed or jus soli regime.14
We also consider additional covariates that have often been found signiﬁcant in related research
on the determinants of institutions. Quantitative and qualitative development indicators such
12For both multinomial logit (a) and (b) we obtain the same results using a balanced sample composed by the
224 countries which constitute the reference sample for the estimation of our full speciﬁcation.
13Moreover, with the mixed regime as the reference category, decolonization displays a signiﬁcantly negative
coeﬃcient for the probability of being jus soli.
14For all three speciﬁcations, we veriﬁed that our results are not driven by outliers.
18as income per capita and inequality could reveal if a richer, more equal country is more open
to inclusiveness. However, both per capita GDP and the Gini index of inequality tend to be
associated with migration, and also with democracy and fractionalization, so they are unlikely to
add independent explanatory power to a regression. In fact they fail to add any further signiﬁcance
to the previous results. Moreover,.a dummy for oil countries could account for the fact that most
of them have been experiencing huge immigration which has had no impact on their still very
restrictive legislation (often based on Islamic family law). A dummy for socialist countries could
instead work as an alternative to our Berlin wall border change dummy.15 However, we cannot
include in the regressions the socialist and oil dummies, as well as the Berlin wall and the other
border changes dummies, due to the fact that all countries identiﬁed by them do not exhibit
enough variability with respect to the dependent variable.16
Table 7 reports the marginal eﬀects of the covariates for the full speciﬁcation. They reveal
further insights such as the signiﬁcant role of decolonization previously mentioned. In particular,
having gone through a decolonization border change decreases the probability of being jus soli by
about 14%. Moreover, an increase in migration of one percentage point increases the probability
of being a jus sanguinis country by about 2.5%, and decreases the probability of having a mixed
regime by 2.3%. Besides, an increase in migration of one percentage point for a jus sanguinis
country decreases the probability of being jus sanguinis by about 2.7%.
Overall, our results indicate that migration, the original laws and our geopolitical dummies
exert a signiﬁcant impact on current citizenship laws, and that other factors such as government
size, demographics and democracy also contribute to their determination. In particular, we show
that legal tradition tends to aﬀect the current legislation persistently, even though the process of
transplantation can prove discontinuous in the case of former colonies. In addition, we show that
a jus sanguinis origin, which is associated with a civil legal origin, is less conducive to adaptation
than a jus soli origin. This suggests that diﬀerent legal traditions tend to be associated with
diﬀerent degrees of ﬂexibility. We also ﬁnd that high migration has a negative impact on the
degree of inclusiveness of a country’s legislation, and in particular on the probability of applying
a mixed regime. However, the full eﬀect of migration is also determined by the interaction term,
15The correlation between Berlin wall and socialist is 0.48.
16For example, no country aﬀected by Berlin wall has ever applied jus soli.
19which is positive for jus sanguinis countries, suggesting that for these countries migration causes
a shift of the legislation toward a mixed regime. The hypothesis of convergence toward a mix
of provisions, suggested by some political theories (see Section 1), ﬁnds partial support in our
results, since it is veriﬁed only for countries with a jus sanguinis origin moving toward a mix,
while it is denied for the rest of the countries. Contrary to our prior, the welfare burden proves
not to be an obstacle for a jus soli legislation. However, this could be explained by the fact
many of the countries with extended welfare systems may favor immigration because of their
demographic crisis. Indeed demographic stagnation encourages the adoption of mixed and jus soli
regimes. Moreover, the impact we observe for the size of government could be explained by the
fact that it proxies for European-style, relative inclusive social-democracies. Finally, the evidence
demonstrates that a high degree of democracy is associated with more inclusiveness, while culture
as captured by religious aﬃliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization appears to be irrelevant.
5.3 Robustness
In this section we present a number of alternatives to our benchmark regressions to investigate
whether they are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations, samples and estimation techniques.
5.3.1 Alternative speciﬁcations
We experiment our multinomial logit speciﬁcations with alternative covariates. First, we replace
our measure of migration with a range of alternative measures. As outlined above, our migration
measure was chosen because it is likely to minimize a potential endogeneity bias. When we
replace our migrations stocks with average migration ﬂows (computed with reference to each
subperiod),17 the coeﬃcients for migration turns out to be insigniﬁcant in all three speciﬁcations.
This could suggest that migration ﬂows are endogenous with respect to citizenship laws. Further
tests involve alternative measures of migration stocks. Rather than entering the stock of migrants
over population in 1960 for the ﬁrst subperiod and in 1980 for the second subperiod, we select
the years 1970 and 1990, respectively, and the 1960-70 and 1980-90 averages, respectively. In the
Table Appendix, Table A.2, column (1) presents the full speciﬁcation with the 1960-70 and 1980-
17Migration stocks and ﬂows show a correlation of 0.45.
2090 averages (average migration stock). With these alternative stock measures, some diﬀerences
emerge in the coeﬃcients for migration and its interaction with jus sanguinis, with the latter
losing signiﬁcance, while the coeﬃcients for the other regressors are largely unaﬀected. Since in
the postwar period migration has been highly regulated by policy in most receiving countries,
and citizenship laws could be viewed as part of migration policy, the simultaneous determination
of citizenship laws and migration does represent a serious concern when we enter within-the-
period data on migration instead of beginning-of-period data. To sum up, our beginning-of-period
migration stocks prove to be the most adequate measures of the role of migration.
Since jus sanguinis and jus soli are closely linked to the civil and common systems of laws,
respectively, the inﬂuence of the legal tradition can also be analyzed through a dummy capturing
t h ep r e s e n c eo fac i v i ll a wt r a d i t i o n( i . e . ,ad u mmy equal to 1 if a country belongs to the civil
law tradition and equal to 0 if a country belongs to common law). The correlation between
the two dummies is 0.35. If the coeﬃcients of the two alternative dummies were the same, one
could conclude that our detailed codiﬁcation of the original citizenship laws does not add much
to what we already knew from a country’s broader legal tradition. However, when we replace
the jus sanguinis with the civil law dummy (see Table A.2, column (2)), the latter turns out
to be substantially less signiﬁcant, and to reduce the signiﬁcance of most other regressors. This
demonstrates that civil law is a much weaker predictor of current citizenship laws than the original
citizenship laws themselves and implies that our citizenship laws classiﬁcation does contain novel
information which is not already embedded in the legal origin data.
We also replace our decolonization dummy with a dummy for British or Portuguese colonies
(identifying those countries that were characterized by a jus soli legislation during the colonial
period), and with the sub-Saharan Africa dummy.18 Both alternatives are associated with insignif-
icant coeﬃcients and marginal eﬀects. This implies that our dummy for a decolonization border
change does capture more precisely an important determinant of current citizenship laws.
18Decolonization shows a signiﬁcant correlation with the dummies for British or Portuguese colony (0.30) and
for sub-Saharan Africa (0.31). Regression results are omitted for brevity.
215.3.2 Alternative estimation techniques
Alternative estimation techniques broadly conﬁrm the same results from Table 7. In particular,
an (unreported) alternative multinomial probit model delivers the same qualitative results.
We also run ordered logit regressions where current citizenship laws are treated as an ordinal
variable, ordered by increasing inclusiveness, with jus sanguinis corresponding to minimal and jus
soli to maximal inclusiveness. These results are reported in Table A.3 in the Table Appendix. Even
though the single coeﬃcient for each covariate that characterizes an ordered logit regression fails to
capture some facets of the issues which are more clearly disentangled by the two coeﬃcients of the
multinomial logit, overall the previous results are conﬁrmed, with migration and a jus sanguinis
origin exerting a negative impact on inclusiveness.
5.3.3 Alternative sample criteria
We also run multinomial logit regressions on a cross-sectional sample composed by country aver-
ages over the 1950-2000 period. In this speciﬁcation the dependent variable is citizenship laws in
2001, while migration stock refers to the year 1960 and jus sanguinis in 1948 is the initial citizen-
ship law. All other covariates are adapted accordingly. Therefore, for instance, the decolonization
dummy identiﬁes all decolonization events occurring during the 1950-2000 period, and the size of
government is an average over the entire period. The results for this cross section reveal a much
lower level of signiﬁcance for several covariates, in particular for migration and for its interaction
with the initial laws.19 This suggests that our panel includes more information on the determi-
nants of citizenship laws than a simple cross section. An alternative ordered logit regression for
the cross section also achieved much weaker results than those found in the panel.20
For the same cross section, we also run an ordinary least squares regression with an alternative
dependent variable, i.e., our general inclusiveness index developed in Section 4, which merges
information from both citizenship laws at birth and naturalization in 2001. Migration turns out
to be insigniﬁcant in these regressions, as it does in a comparable ordinary least squares regression
with an indexed version of 2001 citizenship laws as dependent variable (see Table A.4 in the Table
19We also experiment with migration stocks in 1970 and 1980, and with average migration ﬂows, with similar
results.
20We also apply to the above results the Cook’s distance method to show that they are not driven by outliers.
22Appendix).21 This conﬁrms that our variable reﬂecting citizenship at birth does capture a broader
set of considerations concerning citizenship.
6 An alternative approach: The determinants of change
in citizenship laws
We also study citizenship laws evolution using an alternative approach which is able to provide
us with additional insights about the issue at end. While speciﬁcation (1) focuses on current
citizenship laws as the dependent variable, we developed an alternative speciﬁcation which is
designed to capture more speciﬁcally the determinants of a change in the laws.
6.1 Empirical speciﬁcation
In the alternative speciﬁcation, the dependent variable is the occurrence of a change in citizenship
laws. For our panel, we run a logit model of the following form for its full speciﬁcation:
Dit = αSit + βMit + γSitMit + δPt + Z
0
itη + ξit, (2)
where Dit is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if any change in citizenship laws occurred in
country i and period t and is equal to 0 if no change occurred. The regressors are all the variables
previously described and ξit is the error term.
Pairwise correlations among our new dependent variable, changes in citizenship laws, and the
independent variables are presented in Table 5. The dependent variable is correlated negatively
with a jus sanguinis origin (-0.24) and with the Latin America dummy (-0.22), positively with the
decolonization dummy (0.36).
21The main diﬀerence between the two OLS regressions is that jus sanguinis as initial law becomes insigniﬁcant
when the dependent variable is the inclusiveness index. This diﬀerence is to be attributed to the fact this initial
condition does not exactly match the dependent variable, since data limitations on naturalization in 1948 do not
allow us to compute an initial condition for the inclusiveness index.
236.2 Results
Regression results for the logit models are pres e n t e di nT a b l e8 . O n c ea g a i nw ed e v e l o pt h r e e
alternative speciﬁcations of increasing complexity. Jus sanguinis as the initial law always exerts a
negative impact on change in all three speciﬁcations, suggesting that this kind of regime is the most
resistant to adaptation. While migration has a positive impact on change in the core version (a),
no signiﬁcant eﬀect survives the inclusion of additional covariates. In version (b), decolonization
and Southern Europe appear to exert a positive impact on change, while Latin America resists
it. This conﬁrms our previous ﬁndings, with added implications. In particular, a decolonization
border change - as well as belonging to Southern Europe - tends to induce change, while belonging
to Latin America implies resistance. In the full speciﬁcation, among the additional covariates we
ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on change for the share of young, meaning that relatively old countries are
more likely to adapt their legislation, and a positive eﬀect for the period dummy, i.e., change is
more likely to occur in the second subperiod.
Overall, these results are complementary to those of Section 5 since they highlight which
factors have induced the observed evolution of the legislation. In particular, we have identiﬁed a
jus sanguinis origin as a factor of resistance to change, while migration has an insigniﬁcant impact
on adaptation. The latter eﬀect is probably due to the fact that migration has a complex impact
on a country’s legislation which is not captured by the binary nature of the dependent variable
used in these regressions. Decolonization and the wave of legislative reforms recently occurred
especially in Southern Europe clearly emerge as the major forces that have contributed to the
adaptation of citizenship laws in the postwar period.
6.3 Robustness
As for speciﬁcation (1), we perform a full set of robustness checks for (2). Additional covariates
such as per capita income and the Gini index once again fail to add any signiﬁcance to the logit
estimates and are therefore omitted from the speciﬁcation in Table 8. Alternative measures of
migration conﬁrm an irrelevant impact on change in the laws.
When we replace the dummy reﬂecting jus sanguinis as the initial law with the civil law dummy,
we ﬁnd the latter insigniﬁcant. Similarly, when we replace our decolonization dummy with the
24dummy for British or Portuguese colonies, or with the sub-Saharan Africa dummy, both of them
are insigniﬁcant.
Alternative estimation techniques include a probit version of the model, which delivers results
substantially similar to the logit. We also develop parallel sets of ﬁxed and random eﬀects logit
regressions. Results appear in Table A.5. With ﬁxed eﬀects, the decolonization dummy remains
the only signiﬁcant determinant of change. With random eﬀects, all the covariates which were
found signiﬁcant in the pooled logit remain signiﬁcant. In particular, the decolonization, Latin
America, and Southern Europe dummies still retain a signiﬁcant impact on change.22
7C o n c l u s i o n
We studied the determinants and evolution of the legal institution of citizenship around the world
in the postwar period, on the basis of a new data set we compiled. We found that citizenship
laws have responded endogenously and systematically to migration and the legal tradition, as
well as to postcolonial history, the degree of democracy, the welfare burden, and demographic
factors. In particular, our data conﬁrm the persistence of legal tradition, with a particularly
strong tendency for jus sanguinis to be preserved. The presence of a large stock of migrants tends
to limit the application of jus soli elements, even though for countries with a jus sanguinis origin
a large stock does induce adaptation. Border instability emerges as a decisive factor in shaping
citizenship laws, particularly following the decolonization phase, reﬂecting discontinuities for the
transplanting process of legal institutions. Countries with larger welfare systems, older population
and more political rights tend to be associated with more extended elements of jus soli.
More generally, a clear implication of our investigation is that institutions should not be
presumed to be exogenous, since they do adapt both to economic and non-economic factors. The
endogeneity of institutions to economic factors represents a ﬁrst, well-known challenge for research
aimed at demonstrating that institutions are crucial determinants of economic performances. By
showing that citizenship laws are shaped not only by the broader legal origins, but also by other
institutions such as the internal system of political rights and the international system of relations
22For the sake of comparison, we also run a logit over the cross section, and ﬁnd that the regression yield results
that were similar, even though weaker, than those from the panel.
25as reﬂected by state borders, we also establish that diﬀerent institutions are interrelated. This
is a second challenge for further research on the process of formation of legal rules the impact of
institutions on economic outcomes.
Citizenship laws are still changing. Further research could study the future evolution of citi-
zenship policy, by using projections of international migration patterns in combination with the
available predictions about the future course of democratization and border changes. Finally,
citizenship laws can be viewed as a link, within a legal system, between the public and the private
sphere of inﬂuence. Many issues that fall within the former - such as commercial law, labor reg-
ulation, and government activities - have already been investigated. Our methodology could be
extended to the study of other evolving bodies of the law, such as family law, rules of inheritance,
and women’s rights.
DATA APPENDIX
A. The citizenship-at-birth classiﬁcation
Group 1 (jus sanguinis countries): We include countries where citizenship is passed on to a
child based upon at least one of the parents being a citizen of that country, regardless of the child’s
actual country of birth, and where citizenship is not granted due to birth within the country. In
the application of jus sanguinis, countries may diﬀer on some factors, for example on the father’s
vs. mother’s right to transmit citizenship by descent, the requirement of citizenship for one or
both parents, the relevance of the marital status of the parents. Most of these factors depend on
the interaction between local family law and citizenship law. A common exception to the general
principle of jus sanguinis is automatic citizenship attribution to children of unknown parents.
Since we focus on the degree of inclusiveness of the law toward immigrants, our classiﬁcation does
not emphasize how narrowly jus sanguinis can be speciﬁcally applied to emigrants. Examples of
restrictions are generational requirements limiting the principle of citizenship by descent to the
ﬁrst or second generations of individuals born and residing abroad, residence requirements for
parents, and the requirement that parents must be citizens other than by descent.
Group 2 (countries with a mixed regime): We include those countries where elements
of jus soli are recognized, albeit in a restrictive form, and coexist with varying degrees of jus
26sanguinis. For example, a frequent provision that limits jus soli is double jus soli (i.e., automatic
citizenship for the children of those immigrants who were also born in the country). Another
is the ability, for a child born in a country were jus sanguinis prevails, to acquire citizenship at
some later point (e.g., the age of maturity) subject to either residence requirements or application.
Moreover, we interpret as an element of jus soli, that justiﬁes the inclusion of a country within
Group 2, the existence of a provision that birth in the country matters for naturalization.
Group 3 (jus soli countries): We include those countries where citizenship is automatically
granted due to birth within the country, regardless of the parents’ citizenship or status. Normally
countries that apply jus soli combine it with jus sanguinis provisions for the children of their
citizens born outside of their territory (although limitations to the ability to transmit citizenship
acquired in this manner to the next generation usually apply through, for example, residence
requirements).
B. The border change dummies
We construct three border change dummies (i.e. Decolonization, Berlin Wall, and Other Border
Changes) based on data collected from Polity IV (2002). In particular, from the Polity IV variable
CHANGE we record information on four types of events capable of aﬀecting state borders, i.e.
State Disintegration, State Transformation, State Demise, and State Creation. Even if we set 1948
as the initial date for our citizenship laws analysis, for border changes we include a few earlier
events occurred in the 1943-1948 period that ﬁt within the phase of post-colonial independence.
Examples of the events contained in the Polity IV (2002) data set are the State Disintegration of
Yugoslavia in 1991; the State Transformation of Germany in 1990, East Germany in 1945, West
Germany in 1945, and Russia in 1992); the State Demise of Germany in 1945, East Germany in
1990, West Germany in 1990, and the USSR in 1991. The countries aﬀected by State Creation are
the most numerous. They include the new countries gaining independence - and therefore state
borders - in the postwar decolonization phase, the new countries formed in Europe after the fall
of the Berlin wall, plus a few additional observations not linked to these two waves. Clearly, there
is substantial overlap among the observations recorded in the Polity IV data set. We adapt these
data to our needs by matching them to the 162 countries appearing in our citizenship laws data
set. For instance, we count as a single event, occurring to Germany, the State Transformation
of East and West Germany in 1945, but also the State Demise of Germany in the same year.
27Likewise, we treat as another single event, occurring again to Germany, the State Transformation
of Germany in 1990 and the State Demise of East and West Germany in the same year. On
the other hand, the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan counts for two events, because it
concerns two countries which are in our sample. Additional information, when necessary, was
obtained from the CIA (2002). On this basis, we construct our three border change dummies
for each period under consideration: Decolonization (identifying countries which went through a
post-colonial redeﬁnition of their borders), Berlin wall (identifying countries which went through
a post-1989 Berlin wall border change), and other border changes (identifying countries which
went through other types of boundary changes, of which examples are the split between Pakistan
and Bangladesh, and the uniﬁcation of Vietnam).
C. Deﬁnitions and sources of other covariates
Migration stock: International migration stock (% population). Migration stock is the
number of people born in a country other than that in which they live, including refugees. The
data are taken from United Nations (2003) and are available for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.
Net migration ﬂows: International net migration rate. The data refer to incoming international
migrants less outgoing international migrants, per 1,000 total population. The source is the United
Nations (2005). The data are available over ﬁve year intervals from 1950, with projections until
2050. Civil law: T h es o u r c ei st h el e g a lo r i g i nc l a s s i ﬁcation in La Porta et al. (1999). We
retain only the two main families of common and civil law, without distinguishing, within the
broader civil law tradition, among the French, German, and Scandinavian versions, since they do
not present any signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the issue of citizenship. Moreover, while La Porta et al.
(1999) introduce a separate class for socialist-law countries, we assign them to their own class of
common or civil law as it prevailed before the communist period. Latin America, Southern
Europe and sub-Saharan Africa: Dummies for countries belonging to Latin America, Southern
Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. The classiﬁcation is from UN (2002). British or Portuguese
colony: Dummy for countries that were British or Portuguese colonies any time after 1918.
The source is the ”Correlates of War 2 Project” (2004). Small country: Dummy for countries
with a population size of less than one million over all available years between 1960 and 1995,
as in Easterly and Kraay (2000). Socialist: Dummy for socialist countries. Information is
from La Porta et al. (1999). Oil: Dummy for oil countries (OPEC countries plus Oman, Angola,
28Qatar, Bahrain, and Brunei). Government consumption: Government share of GDP in current
prices, taken from Penn World Tables (2002). Share of young: Share of young between age
15 and 34 (% population). The data are taken from United Nations (2005). Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization: Composite index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, taken from Easterly and
Levine (1997). Catholic share: Percentage of Catholics in 1980, taken from La Porta et al.
(1999). Political rights: Political rights index, taken from Freedom House (1996). GDP per
capita: Logarithm of real GDP per capita at current international prices, taken from Penn World
Tables (2002). Gini index: Gini index of inequality, taken from Deininger and Squire (1996).
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31Table 1 
Citizenship Laws Evolution: Transition Matrices  
 
 
  Citizenship laws in 2001   




Jus soli  
regime 
Total 
Jus sanguinis regime  46  20  1  67 
Mixed regime  11  6  2  19 
Jus soli regime  31  9  36  76 
Total 88  35  39  162 
  Citizenship laws in 1975   




Jus soli  
regime 
Total 
Jus sanguinis regime  63  3  1  67 
Mixed regime  10  7  2  19 
Jus soli regime  28  1  47  76 
Total 101  11  50  162 
  Citizenship laws in 2001   




Jus soli  
regime 
Total 
Jus sanguinis regime  81  20  0  101 
Mixed regime  2  9  0  11 
Jus soli regime  5  6  39  50 




Changes in Citizenship Laws 
 
  Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 2001)   
Citizenship laws in 1948  No change  Change  Total 
Jus sanguinis regime  46  21  67 
Mixed regime  6  13  19 
Jus soli regime  36  40  76 
Total 88  74  162 
  Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 1975)   
Citizenship laws in 1948  No change  Change  Total 
Jus sanguinis regime  63  4  67 
Mixed regime  7  12  19 
Jus soli regime  47  29  76 
Total 117  45  162 
  Changes in citizenship laws (1975 to 2001)   
Citizenship laws in 1975  No change  Change  Total 
Jus sanguinis regime  81  20  101 
Mixed regime  9  2  11 
Jus soli regime  39  11  50 
Total 129  33  162 
 Table 3 
Citizenship Laws Data Set: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Citizenship laws in 2001  162  1.698 0.835  1 3 
Citizenship laws in 1975  162  1.685 0.916  1 3 
Citizenship laws in 1948  162  2.056 0.941  1 3 
Changes in citizenship laws (1948 to 2001)  162 0.457  0.500  0  1 
Naturalization in 2001  142 2.458  0.920  1  4 








Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Current citizenship laws  324 1.691 0.875  1  3 
Changes in citizenship laws  324 0.241 0.428  0  1 
Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law  324 0.519 0.500  0  1 
Civil legal origin  324 0.673 0.470  0  1 
Migration stock   300 5.646 9.713 0.011  70.673 
Net migration flows   318 -0.116 8.551 -47.95 63.35 
Decolonization  324 0.250 0.434  0  1 
Berlin wall  324 0.052 0.223  0  1 
Other border changes  324 0.022 0.146  0  1 
Latin America  324 0.173 0.379  0  1 
Southern Europe  324 0.043 0.204  0  1 
Small country  324 0.160 0.368  0  1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  324 0.265 0.442  0  1 
British or Portuguese colony  324 0.333 0.472  0  1 
Socialist  324 0.173 0.379  0  1 
Oil  324 0.086 0.281  0  1 
Political rights  276 3.730 2.040  1  7 
Catholic share  324 31.535 35.572  0  97.3 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  272 0.349 0.299  0  0.890 
Government consumption   263 19.617 11.342 2.492 72.233 
Share of young   324  34.54 3.47 27.01  53.36 
Log GDP per capita  263 7.488 1.249 4.979  10.060 
Gini index   155 40.425 9.966 20.495  63.180 
   § The sample includes two cross sections of  162 countries. The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second 





Pairwise Correlations Among Dependent and Independent Variables, 1950-2000
§ 
 
 Citizenship  laws 
 
Changes in citizenship laws 
Migration stock      -0.12**   0.08 
Net migration flows    -0.11*  -0.03 
Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law       -0.64***       -0.24*** 
Civil legal origin       -0.15***       -0.15*** 
Decolonization  -0.09        0.36*** 
Berlin wall  -0.08     0.09* 
Other border changes  -0.07 -0.03 
Latin America        0.60***       -0.22*** 
Southern Europe  -0.05     0.09* 
Small country      0.14**   0.05 
Sub-Saharan Africa     -0.12**        0.15*** 
British or Portuguese colony  0.02        0.15*** 
Socialist       -0.25***   -0.10* 
Oil     -0.13**   0.01 
Political rights        0.29***   0.05 
Catholic share        0.39***                        -0.07 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization    -0.10*        0.17*** 
Government consumption  -0.03 -0.05 
Share of young   -0.03     -0.13** 
Log GDP per capita   0.05  -0.03 
Gini Index        0.22***  -0.09 
§ The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries. The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod 
while the second cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod. For details about the construction of the variables 
see the text.  
               * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
Table 6 
The Determinants of Citizenship Laws: Multinomial Logit Estimates, 1950-2000
§ 
 
 (a)  (b) (c) 
 
Mixed  
regime   
Jus soli 
regime 





regime   
Jus soli  
regime 
Migration  stock  -0.051 -0.055 -0.054  -0.032  -0.167 -0.045 
 [-1.86]*  [-2.81]*** [-1.79]*  [-1.61]  [-2.30]**  [-1.53] 
Jus sang. as init. cit. law  -2.044  -6.048  -2.712  -6.117  -4.568  -7.59 
  [-4.39]*** [-5.43]*** [-4.99]***  [-4.90]***  [-5.24]*** [-4.38]*** 
Period  1.887 1.193 1.409  -0.272  2.385 0.211 
  [4.28]*** [3.02]*** [2.28]**  [-0.47]  [2.65]*** [0.27] 
Decolonization    -1.296  -2.211  -0.084  -1.523 
    [-1.87]*  [-3.41]***  [-0.09]  [-1.55] 
Southern  Europe    1.224  -0.153  1.234  1.187 
    [2.03]**  [-0.14]  [1.69]*  [0.87] 
Latin  America    -0.799  2.866  -0.621  4.495 
    [-0.70]  [3.73]***  [-0.51]  [2.93]*** 
Small  country    -0.804  0.415  -2.566  0.523 
    [-1.23]  [0.69]  [-1.88]*  [0.64] 
Jus san. X migration stock          0.156  0.084 
        [1.81]*  [1.75]* 
Government  consumption        0.035  0.063 
        [1.07]  [2.68]*** 
Share of young           -0.193  -0.397 
        [-1.75]*  [-2.43]** 
Catholic  share        0.012  0.01 
        [1.46]  [0.70] 
Ethno.  fractionalization        0.023  1.277 
        [0.02]  [1.02] 
Political  rights        0.548  0.426 
        [2.84]***  [2.46]** 
Constant  -1.092  0.626 -0.024 1.353  3.716 11.165 
 [-2.73]***  [2.48]**  [-0.03]  [2.43]**  [1.05]  [2.09]** 
Observations  300 300 300  300  224 224 
Log likelihood  -195.77    -155.94    -95.24   
Maximum Likelihood R2  0.45    0.58    0.68   
McFadden's  R2  0.32   0.46    0.57  
McFadden's Adj R2  0.29    0.4    0.44   
Cragg & Uhler's R2  0.53    0.68    0.79   
Count  R2  0.71   0.81    0.83  
Adj Count R2  0.32    0.55    0.64   
§ Jus sanguinis is the reference category. Robust z statistics in brackets, clustered at country level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
Table 7 
Marginal Effects for Multinomial Logit Estimates, 1950-2000, Full Specification
§ 
 
  Jus sanguinis regime Mixed regime  Jus soli regime 
Migration stock  0.025   -0.023   -0.001 
 [0.010]**  [0.011]**  [0.004] 
Jus sanguinis as initial cit. law  0.875  -0.193   -0.681 
 [0.047]***  [0.075]**  [0.086]*** 
Period -0.303    0.336  -0.034 
 [0.155]*  [0.117]***  [0.077] 
Decolonization 0.123  0.016  -0.139   
 [0.155]  [0.125]  [0.079]* 
Southern Europe  -0.291  0.170  0.121 
 [0.193]  [0.166]  [0.236] 
Latin America  -0.611  -0.194  0.805 
 [0.147]***  [0.068]***  [0.140]*** 
Small country  0.088  -0.203  0.114 
 [0.149]  [0.064]***  [0.133] 
Jus sanguinis X migration stock  -0.027   0.021  0.006 
 [0.011]**  [0.014]  [0.007] 
Government consumption  -0.010   0.004  0.007  
 [0.005]**  [0.005]  [0.003]** 
Share of young   0.061  -0.018  -0.043  
 [0.023]***  [0.016]  [0.020]** 
Catholic share  -0.002  0.001  0.001 
 [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.002] 
Ethno. fractionalization  -0.124  -0.028  0.152 
 [0.219]  [0.171]  [0.159] 
Political rights  -0.107  0.069  0.037   
 [0.031]***  [0.027]***  [0.02]* 
§ The full specification refers to specification (c) in Table 6. Robust standard errors in brackets.     
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Table 8 
The Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws: Logit Estimates (pooled), 1950-2000
§ 
 








Migration stock  0.021  0.014  0.031 
 [1.89]*  [1.18]  [1.08] 
Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law  -1.182  -1.672  -1.133 
 [-4.04]***  [-4.62]***  [-2.14]** 
Period -0.417  0.763  1.466 
 [-1.46]  [1.60]  [1.84]* 
Decolonization   1.798  2.677 
   [3.82]***  [3.06]*** 
Southern Europe    1.968  1.943 
   [3.18]***  [3.75]*** 
Latin America    -2.731  -2.356 
   [-3.45]***  [-2.29]** 
Small country    -0.135  -0.636 
   [-0.33]  [-0.98] 
Jus sanguinis X migration stock      -0.017 
     [-0.35] 
Government consumption      -0.023 
     [-1.24] 
Share of young       -0.199 
     [-1.77]* 
Catholic share      0.000 
     [0.07] 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization      1.227 
     [1.46] 
Political rights      0.112 
     [0.95] 
Constant -0.596  -1.326  3.844 
 [-2.74]***  [-2.88]***  [1.04] 
Observations 300  300  224 
Log likelihood  -154.7  -124.25  -85.05 
Maximum Likelihood R2  0.08  0.25  0.27 
McFadden's R2  0.07  0.25  0.29 
McFadden's Adj R2  0.05  0.21  0.18 
Cragg & Uhler's R2  0.11  0.37  0.41 
Count R2  0.77  0.85  0.85 
Adj Count R2  0.04  0.37  0.33 
   
§  Robust z statistics in brackets, clustered at country level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 TABLE APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A.1  






as initial  






















Jus sanguinis as initial c. l.   1.00                   
                
Civil legal origin  0.35 1.00                
  (0.00)               
Migration stock  0.02 -0.16  1.00              
  (0.75) (0.01)                
Net migration flows  0.03 -0.01  0.45 1.00            
  (0.54) (0.88) (0.00)              
Decolonization  -0.31 -0.19 0.05  -0.02 1.00           
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.74)            
Berlin wall  0.23 0.16 -0.06  -0.06  -0.14  1.00        
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.27) (0.01)           
Other border changes  0.06  -0.03 -0.03 0.01  0.06  -0.03 1.00       
  (0.30) (0.56) (0.56) (0.87) (0.27)  (0.53)        
Latin America  -0.43 0.04  -0.12 -0.18 -0.15  -0.11 -0.07  1.00     
  (0.00) (0.47) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.22)       
Southern Europe  0.11 0.15 -0.10  -0.02  -0.12  0.09 -0.03  -0.10  1.00   
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.73) (0.03)  (0.12) (0.57)  (0.08)     
Small country  -0.20 -0.27 0.09  -0.05 0.14  -0.10 -0.01  0.11  -0.01  1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.41) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.90)  (0.04)  (0.85)   
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 0.31  -0.14 -0.09  -0.27  -0.13  0.08 
  (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.65) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.11)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.15) 
Brit. or Portug. colony  -0.21 -0.60 0.22  0.03  0.30  -0.17 0.08  -0.01  -0.09  0.44 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.18)  (0.84)  (0.12)  (0.00) 
Socialist  0.34 0.28 -0.15  -0.07  -0.17  0.48 0.04  -0.17  0.06  -0.20 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.24) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.43)  (0.00)  (0.25)  (0.00) 
Oil  0.08 -0.02  0.35 0.36 0.05  -0.07  -0.05  -0.08  -0.07  -0.01 
  (0.17) (0.72) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36)  (0.19) (0.41)  (0.14)  (0.24)  (0.79) 
Political rights  -0.10 -0.15 0.04  -0.00 -0.27  0.09  0.01  0.11  0.16  0.12 
  (0.11) (0.01) (0.52) (0.98) (0.00)  (0.13) (0.93)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.05) 
Catholic share  -0.24 0.26  -0.15 -0.14 -0.20  -0.05 -0.11  0.52  0.26  0.03 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.40) (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.58) 
Ethno. fractionalization  -0.12 -0.25 0.01  0.09  0.24  -0.06 -0.09  -0.27  -0.16  -0.02 
  (0.06) (0.00) (0.89) (0.13) (0.00)  (0.31) (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.73) 
Government consumption  0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.02  0.02  0.19 0.03  -0.04  -0.07  0.10 
  (0.44) (0.61) (0.25) (0.72) (0.75)  (0.00) (0.66)  (0.51)  (0.24)  (0.09) 
Share of young  -0.10 -0.18 0.35  0.40  0.10  -0.21 -0.07  0.10  -0.22  0.10 
  (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08)  (0.00) (0.19)  (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.06) 
Log GDP per capita  0.24 0.06 0.26 0.18 -0.54  0.25 -0.09  0.03  0.18  0.11 
  (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.16)  (0.64)  (0.00)  (0.08) 
Gini index  -0.34 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 0.05  -0.28 -0.11  0.49  -0.16  0.23 




























Jus sanguinis as initial c. l.                     
                
Civil legal origin                
                
Migration stock                
                
Net migration flows                
                
Decolonization                
                
Berlin wall                
                
Other border changes                
                
Latin America                
                
Southern Europe                
                
Small country                
                
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.00              
                
Brit. or Portug. colony  0.17  1.00             
  ( 0 . 0 0 )               
Socialist  -0.27  -0.29  1.00            
  (0.00)  (0.00)             
Oil  -0.09  0.11  -0.14  1.00          
  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.01)            
Political rights  -0.39  -0.08 -0.18 -0.20 1.00           
  (0.00)  (0.18) (0.00) (0.00)            
Catholic share  -0.06  -0.17 -0.15 -0.16 0.23  1.00         
  (0.31)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)           
Ethno. fractionalization  0.61  0.15 -0.18  0.09 -0.36  -0.18  1.00       
  (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00)  (0.00)        
Government consumption  0.16  0.17 0.14 -0.03  -0.25  -0.06  0.05  1.00     
  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.03) (0.62) (0.00)  (0.37) (0.48)       
Share of young  0.07  0.27 -0.19  0.43 -0.37  -0.19  0.24  0.22  1.00  
  (0.21)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)     
Log GDP per capita  -0.48  -0.17  0.18 0.07 0.55  0.07 -0.40  -0.03  -0.14  1.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00)  (0.25) (0.00)  (0.62)  (0.02)  
Gini index  0.31  0.18 -0.44  -0.01  -0.27  0.25 0.27  0.05  0.50 -0.34 
  (0.00)  (0.03) (0.00) (0.94) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.58)  (0.00) (0.00) 
§ The sample includes two cross sections of 162 countries. The first cross section refers to the 1950-1975 subperiod while the second 
cross section refers to the 1976-2000 subperiod. For details about the construction of the variables see the text. P-value in parentheses.  
 Table A.2 
The Determinants of Citizenship Laws: Multinomial Logit Estimates, 1950-2000
§, 
 Alternative Covariates 
 










Migration stock     -0.056 -0.013 
     [-0.81] [-0.36] 
Average migration stock  -0.152  -0.052     
 [-2.12]**  [-1.62]     
Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law -4.533  -7.344    
 [-5.09]***  [-4.12]***    
Civil legal origin     0.941 -1.742 
     [1.21] [-1.88]* 
Period 2.397  0.260  1.834  -0.649 
 [2.68]***  [0.33]  [2.84]***  [-1.31] 
Decolonization -0.140  -1.525  1.509  -0.003 
 [-0.16]  [-1.54]  [1.79]*  [-0.01] 
Southern Europe  1.218  1.062  0.908  0.595 
 [1.64]  [0.76]  [1.22]  [0.42] 
Latin America  -0.667  4.317  -0.046  5.436 
 [-0.55]  [2.73]***  [-0.03]  [3.64]*** 
Small country  -2.503  0.560  -1.894  1.128 
 [-1.90]*  [0.67]  [-1.89]*  [1.29] 
Jus san. X average migration stock  0.140  0.040    
 [1.65]*  [0.61]    
Civil legal origin X migration stock     0.019 -0.110 
     [0.23] [-1.10] 
Government consumption  0.036  0.063  0.043  0.068 
 [1.09]  [2.65]***  [1.25]  [2.59]*** 
Share of young  -0.197  -0.402  -0.096  -0.247 
 [-1.78]*  [-2.46]**  [-1.16]  [-1.98]** 
Catholic share  0.012  0.011  0.006  0.017 
 [1.52]  [0.75]  [0.81]  [1.38] 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization -0.035 1.290  1.029  1.950 
 [-0.03]  [1.03]  [0.85]  [1.74]* 
Political rights  0.539  0.436  0.563  0.276 
 [2.78]***  [2.52]**  [2.58]**  [1.56] 
Constant 3.831  11.273  -3.567  4.527 
 [1.08]  [2.11]**  [-1.04]  [1.01] 
Observations 224  224  224  224 
Log likelihood  -95.74    -132.01   
Maximum Likelihood R2  0.68    0.55   
McFadden's R2  0.57    0.41   
McFadden's Adj R2  0.44    0.28   
Cragg & Uhler's R2  0.78    0.64   
Count R2  0.83    0.75   
Adj Count R2  0.64    0.48   
§ Jus sanguinis is the reference category. Robust z statistics in brackets, clustered at country level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Table A.3 
The Determinants of Citizenship Laws: Ordered Logit Estimates, 1950-2000
§ 
 
  (a) (b) (c) 
  Citizenship laws  Citizenship laws  Citizenship laws 
Migration stock  -0.048  -0.032  -0.048 
 [-2.80]***  [-1.95]*  [-1.71]* 
Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law  -3.356  -3.452  -4.113 
 [-11.80]***  [-9.25]***  [-6.40]*** 
Period 0.882  0.084  0.204 
 [3.22]***  [0.24]  [0.37] 
Decolonization   -1.761  -1.187 
   [-3.90]***  [-1.58] 
Southern Europe    0.643  1.071 
   [1.31]  [1.80]* 
Latin America    2.616  3.756 
   [4.02]***  [4.45]*** 
Small country    0.27  0.502 
   [0.55]  [0.74] 
Jus san. X  migration stock      0.045 
     [1.13] 
Government consumption      0.044 
     [2.59]*** 
Share of young       -0.24 
     [-2.32]** 
Catholic share      0.001 
     [0.17] 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization      1.28 
     [1.52] 
Political rights      0.357 
     [2.93]*** 
Observations 300  300  224 
Log likelihood  -210.85  -174.82  -117.59 
Maximum Likelihood R2  0.4  0.52  0.61 
McFadden's R2  0.26  0.39  0.47 
McFadden's Adj R2  0.25  0.36  0.4 
Cragg & Uhler's R2  0.46  0.62  0.7 
Count R2  0.71  0.78  0.79 
Adj Count R2  0.32  0.5  0.56 
§ Jus sanguinis is the reference category. Robust z statistics in brackets, clustered at country level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
 Table A.4 





Citizenship laws  
index 
Migration stock in 1960  0.003  -0.002 
 [1.12]  [-0.43] 
Jus sanguinis as citizenship law in 1948  -0.078  -0.223 
 [-1.24]  [-2.10]** 
Decolonization -0.153  -0.166 
 [-2.08]**  [-1.71]* 
Southern Europe  -0.096  0.110 
 [-1.20]  [1.29] 
Latin America  0.387  0.555 
 [3.78]***  [5.30]*** 
Small country  0.020  0.049 
 [0.27]  [0.40] 
Jus san. in 1948 X migration stock in 1960  -0.007  0.002 
 [-2.14]**  [0.30] 
Government consumption  0.005  0.007 
 [1.62]  [1.95]* 
Share of young  -0.025  -0.035 
 [-2.18]**  [-2.12]** 
Catholic share  0.000  0.000 
 [0.23]  [0.37] 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  0.147  0.190 
 [1.48]  [1.62] 
Political rights  0.026  0.038 
 [1.57]  [1.45] 
Constant 1.098  1.259 
  [2.57]** [1.95]* 
Number of observations  104 119 
R-squared  0.549 0.536 
Adjusted R-squared  0.489 0.483 
§ The sample is a cross section with averages over the 1950-2000 period. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at country level.  




Table A.5  
The Determinants of Change in Citizenship Laws: Logit Estimates, 1950-2000
§,  
Fixed and Random Effects 
 
  Fixed effects  Random effects 
  Change in cit. laws  Change in cit. laws 
Migration stock  0.115  0.031 
 [0.74]  [0.84] 
Jus sanguinis as initial citizenship law  -0.979  -1.133 
 [-0.94]  [-2.03]** 
Period 1.256  1.466 
 [1.64]  [2.32]** 
Decolonization 3.019  2.677 
 [2.15]**  [3.91]*** 
Southern Europe    1.943 
   [2.09]** 
Latin America    -2.356 
   [-2.04]** 
Small country    -0.636 
   [-0.97] 
Jus san. X migration stock  0.009  -0.017 
 [0.08]  [-0.29] 
Government consumption  0.057  -0.023 
 [0.81]  [-1.10] 
Share of young   -0.067  -0.199 
 [-0.24]  [-2.00]** 
Catholic share    0.000 
   [0.06] 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization    1.227 
   [1.44] 
Political rights  -0.009  0.112 
 [-0.02]  [0.87] 
Constant   3.844 
   [1.13] 
Observations 92  224 
Number of groups  46  118 
Log likelihood  -16.282  -85.046 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 